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Russia goes on the offensive 
ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius
Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga
In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics 
from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts 
comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius 
on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to 
initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way 
for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between 
the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, 
any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern 
Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s poli-
cies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began 
in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is 
expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s 
overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to 
adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project pro-
posed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these 
states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing 
closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the be-
nefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of 
Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfal-
ls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The 
upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock 
themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo 
a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the 
possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.
Russia’s efforts to date
The most noticeable element in the Kremlin’s 
current offensive has been the decision to block 
the imports of Ukrainian goods across the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian border on 14-20 August. After the 
Russian authorities lifted the blockade, Vladimir 
Putin’s adviser, Sergei Glazev, warned Ukraine that 
if Kiev went ahead with the signing of the associ-
ation agreement, Moscow would be forced to ex-
clude Ukraine from the CIS free trade agreement. 
Meanwhile, the Eurasian Economic Commission, 
the governing body of the integration structures 
developed by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, has 
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published a draft document which would, as of 
1 November 2013, introduce measures designed 
to protect the Customs Union market against 
goods from third countries that join other trade 
blocs (after signing the AA/DCFTA, Ukraine would 
fall into this category). In addition, Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Rogozin has forewarned about 
the possibility of breaking off Russia’s links with 
the Ukrainian aviation industry. Moscow has also 
revisited the issue of the customs tariffs charged 
by Ukraine on Russian supplies for the Black 
Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine. Russian officials 
claimed that the tariffs were illegal and the es-
timated $200 million collected by Kiev should be 
added by Moscow to Ukraine’s sovereign debt. 
Furthermore, on 10 September of this year Mos-
cow announced that from 2014 it would no lon-
ger use the NITKA military training ground, which 
last year cost Moscow nearly $1.4 million. By de-
manding far-reaching concessions from Kiev, Rus-
sia has also effectively blocked any negotiations 
on a possible cut in the price of Russian gas im-
ported by Ukraine1. At the same time, Moscow 
has been highlighting the ways in which Ukraine 
could benefit from joining the Eurasian integra-
tion process headed by Russia. Sergei Glazev has 
said for example that once Ukraine is part of the 
Eurasian structures it would be able to purchase 
Russian gas at the same price as Belarus, that is, 
two or three times cheaper than currently. More-
over, Russia would no longer levy export tariffs 
on oil exported to Ukraine. Both of these conces-
sions, along with trade preferences for Customs 
Union members, would benefit Ukraine to the 
tune of $11-12 billion a year2.
Although Russia’s efforts have been focused 
mainly on Ukraine, whose negotiations with 
1 T. Iwański, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, Russia counter-
acts Ukraine’s moves towards the European Union, 
Eastweek, No. 26 (269), http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/eastweek /2013-08-28/russia-counter-
acts-ukraine-s-moves-towards-european-union
2 It should be noted that Sergei Glazev’s declarations 
seem rather improbable. Fossil fuels are excluded from 
Customs Union regulations and their cost could be re-
duced through preferential pricing, which in the long 
term Russia cannot afford.
Brussels are the most advanced, Moscow has 
also been trying to influence the other coun-
tries preparing to initial association agreements 
with the EU. Russia’s consumer rights watchdog 
Rospotrebnadzor, has introduced an embargo 
on the import of Moldovan alcohol, effec-
tive from 11 September of this year. The clo-
sure of the Russian market to Moldovan wine 
producers, who export up to 30% of their pro-
duction to Russia, will cost them an estimated 
$5 million a month3. Rospotrebnadzor has also 
started to raise questions about the quality of 
Moldovan fruit, which might eventually lead to 
the introduction of an import ban. Earlier, Dmi-
try Rogozin, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister and 
Special Representative for Transnistria, warned 
that Moldova’s decision to sign an associa-
tion agreement with the EU would necessitate 
a revision of the existing agreements between 
Russia and Moldova. It could harm Moldovan 
exports, hamper the supply of Russian gas to 
the country, and lead to restrictions for Moldo-
van migrant workers. Rogozin has also said that 
closer relations between the EU and Moldova 
would have a negative impact on the Trans-
nistrian settlement. Meanwhile, Transnistria 
has received $150 million in aid from Russia 
(equivalent to the total annual revenue of the 
republic’s budget) to improve welfare in the 
breakaway republic4. Recently, Russia has also 
increased its presence in Transnistria through 
3 According to Moldova’s Office for National Statistics, 
in 2012 Moldovan wine exports to Russia were worth 
$61.02 million.
4 The grant was first announced by Russia in April 2012, 
and the information was repeated during Dmitry Rogo-
zin’s visit to Transnistria in September 2013. During the 
trip, Rogozin attended the opening of the first public 
buildings built with Russian money.
The most visible and extensive actions 
taken by Moscow ahead of the Vilnius 
summit have been directed at Ukraine.
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networks of experts5 and investment projects6. 
It is also likely that the growing calls for an in-
dependence referendum in Moldova’s pro-Rus-
sian autonomous region of Gagauzia have been 
encouraged by the Kremlin7. 
In its relations with Armenia, meanwhile, Rus-
sia appears to have focused mainly on securi-
ty issues. Traditionally, Russia has been a staunch 
supporter of Armenia in the Armenian-Azerbai-
jani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; more re-
cently, however, Moscow’s actions have begun to 
suggest the possibility of a change in Russia’s pol-
icy. On 13 August, President Vladimir Putin made 
his first trip to Baku in seven years. During the 
visit, media reports publicised the fact that Russia 
would sell to Azerbaijan weapons worth an esti-
mated $4 billion. In addition, in July of this year, 
Gazprom (which controls Armenia’s gas company 
ArmRosGazprom) raised gas tariffs for individual 
consumers in Armenia by 50%, after which Russia 
suggested that the price hike could be reversed 
if Armenia agreed to join the Customs Union. 
Consequently, following his Moscow meeting 
5 Moscow has opened a branch of the Russian Institute for 
Strategic Studies in Transnistria, and in February 2013 
it set up a group of experts, who will support Trans-
nistria in its efforts to adapt its legislation to Russian 
standards.
6 During the Third Transnistrian Investment Forum, Rus-
sian companies signed contracts for a series of projects 
in Transnistria, worth an estimated $40 million. In addi-
tion, Russia’s ambassador to Moldova Farid Mukhamet-
shin announced that in 2013 the Moscow-sponsored 
Yerevan Integration would carry out social projects (in-
cluding infrastructure project) worth over $60 million.
7 At this stage the separatist demands are unrealistic; 
however, raising this issue could contribute to the de-
stabilisation of the situation in the region.
with President Vladimir Putin on 3 September, 
Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan announced 
that Armenia had made the decision to seek ac-
cession to the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, and was interested in becoming 
a founding member of the Eurasian Economic 
Union8.
On the other hand, Russia has shown no ac-
tivity in its relations with Georgia in the past 
few weeks. However, in a recent statement 
Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili did not rule 
out greater integration with Russia, which 
might suggest that Moscow and Tbilisi have 
been holding talks on the matter behind the 
scenes9.
The significance of the Vilnius summit 
for Russia
The prospect that a group of states which have 
traditionally found themselves in Russia’s sphere 
of influence might now be signing or initial-
ling agreements tightening their cooperation 
with the European Union is seen by Moscow 
as a threat to both its symbolic status and 
to its real geopolitical position in the region.
First, such a development would deal a serious 
blow to Russia’s political image. By adopting 
the documents drafted for the Vilnius summit, 
four countries in the region would officially de-
clare a pro-Western orientation in their foreign 
policy. Russia has always seen the relations be-
tween post-Soviet republics and the European 
Union as being in competition to its own re-
lations with these countries, and has taken 
measures to counteract Brussels’ attempts to 
promote closer cooperation with the region. 
Therefore, a decision by the governments of 
Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia to 
formally confirm their intention to integrate 
8 S. Ananicz, Armenia turns away from the EU, Eastweek, 
No. 27 (270), http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-
week/2013-09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu
9 Cf. Бидзина Иванишвили присматривается к Евразий-
скому союзу, Kommiersant, 10.09.2013, http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/2275559
The prospect that a group of states which 
have traditionally found themselves in Rus-
sia’s sphere of influence might sign or initial 
agreements deepening their cooperation 
with the European Union is seen by Moscow 
as a threat to both its symbolic status and 
to its real geopolitical position in the region.
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with the EU would be a clear indication that 
this policy has failed. It would also suggest that 
Moscow was losing out to Brussels in what the 
Russian public sees as a rivalry over the geo-
political orientation of these countries. Conse-
quently, such a development would mean, at 
least in symbolic terms, the shrinking of the 
sphere of Russian predominant influence in the 
region and would undermine Russia’s image as 
a power capable of controlling the post-Soviet 
region. This would weaken Russia’s internation-
al standing not only in its relations with other 
CIS member states but also with the West. Up 
till now, Russia has been able to invoke the ar-
gument of its alleged “natural” patronage over 
the region to persuade the West that it should 
recognise Moscow’s right to participate in all 
decisions concerning this part of the world.
Russia perceives adoption of a pro-European 
foreign policy orientation by post-Soviet states 
as an identity-defining decision, tantamount 
to a choice of a value system, economic regime 
and governance model alternative to those of-
fered by Russia. That is why the symbolism of 
the Vilnius summit is so important for Russia, ir-
respective of whether the signatory states deliver 
on their commitments and implement real inter-
nal reforms. The symbolic aspect is particularly 
significant in the case of Ukraine, because some 
segments of Russian society (both within the elite 
and among ordinary people) regard Ukraine as 
a historical part of Russia and Ukrainians as a local 
subgroup of a Russian nation. This belief seems to 
be shared by President Putin, as he demonstrat-
ed in his remarks on Ukraine’s prospects for EU 
accession10. Therefore, Kiev’s choice not to adopt 
a pro-Russian orientation would constitute a pol-
icy defeat for the Kremlin, that might have nega-
tive reverberations in the Russian domestic politi-
cal arena as well. 
The signing of the association agreements 
would also be a heavy blow to the Eurasian 
10 Cf. Путин: Россия и Украина представляют один на-
род, Rossijskaja Gazieta, 4.09.2013, http://www.rg.
ru/2013/09/04/ukraina-anons.html
integration project, which the Russian gov-
ernment sees as its top priority. By building 
the Eurasian Economic Union (which began 
with the establishment of the Customs Union) 
Moscow hoped to maintain its control over the 
post-Soviet region by strengthening and for-
malising its economic ties with the republics11. 
Their decision to enter into a DCFTA with the 
EU, however, would prevent them from joining 
the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. Particularly damaging would be the ex-
clusion of Ukraine from the group of potential 
participants in this project. Without Ukraine, 
which is the second largest economy and the 
second largest market in the region, the Cus-
toms Union would lose much of its appeal to 
prospective members and external partners. 
It is highly probable that without Ukraine the 
Customs Union might gradually die.
The association of the former Soviet republics 
with the European Union would pose a real 
threat to Russia’s influence in the region. This 
is because the association agreements re-
quire the signatory states to ali ne their legal 
and economic systems with EU standards. 
The  agreements contain over half of the re-
quirements of the EU’s acquis communautaire. 
Their implementation would therefore begin 
to differentiate Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia 
and Georgia from the rest of the region, which 
continues to follow Soviet-style rules of gov-
ernance. Consequently,  Russia would find it 
11 On 1 January 2012, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
launched the Common Economic Space, which is seen 
as a transition structure between the Customs Union 
and the Eurasian Economic Union. Any state interested 
in joining the Eurasian integration process would have 
to first become a member of the Customs Union.
The signing of the association agreements 
would likely spell the collapse of the Eura-
sian integration project, which the Russian 
government sees as its top priority.
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much more difficult to influence the states 
associated with the EU, as it could no longer 
take advantage of the current lack of trans-
parency in decision-making that plagues 
former Soviet republics. Similarly, Russian 
businesses would also have to start competing 
on an equal footing against international play-
ers, as they would no longer be able to rely on 
their familiarity with the post-Soviet economic 
system, or benefit from numerous informal ties 
and networks.
In addition, Russia has also raised concerns 
about the fact that following the abolition of 
customs duties in trade with the EU, the new 
signatories to the DCFTA would be flooded 
with cheaper goods. This could potentially re-
duce the attractiveness of some Russian goods, 
which until now could compete with EU goods 
thanks to their low price. However, given that 
the trade with the potential four new signato-
ries to the DCFTA accounts for just 5.7% of Rus-
sia’s total foreign trade (of this Ukraine’s share 
amounts to 5.4%), this is not a particularly seri-
ous problem. Furthermore, Moscow fears that 
manufacturers in the states entering the DCF-
TAs, subject to growing competition from the 
EU in their home markets, will intensify their 
efforts to export to the Russian market. Mos-
cow has also voiced concern over the increased 
risk of an illegal influx of European goods to 
the Russian market, especially from Ukraine, 
which together with Russia is a part of the CIS 
free trade zone. Hence,  Russia would need to 
make costly improvements in the efficiency 
of its customs posts at its borders with the 
new signatories to the DCFTA. 
Russia’s possible future actions
Russia sees the prospect of a formal strength-
ening of cooperation between the EU and four 
of the former Soviet republics as a threat to its 
policy towards the CIS. Therefore, the primary 
objective of its current offensive is to prevent or 
at least weaken the success of the Vilnius sum-
mit. In the run-up to the November summit we 
can expect Russia to continue to put pres-
sure on the countries in the region in order to 
block the signing of the association agreement 
by Ukraine and the initialling of association 
agreements by Moldova and Georgia. In the 
case of Armenia, the initialling of an AA/DCFTA 
has been, most likely, made impossible by Ye-
revan’s declaration of its accession to the Cus-
toms Union, and so Moscow no longer needs 
to pressure Armenia. In order to influence the 
geopolitical choices of the states in the region, 
Russia will continue to rely on its position as 
a major trading partner for Ukraine, Moldova 
and Armenia. Access to the Russian market is of 
strategic importance for these countries’ econ-
omies, especially in the case of Ukraine, where 
many large industrial plants still form a part 
of production chains inherited from the Soviet 
Union, which means that some of the produc-
tion process takes place in Russia. Until the Vil-
nius summit, Russia is likely to keep in place its 
existing restrictions on trade with Ukraine and 
Moldova12. Moscow may also decide to impose 
an embargo on Moldovan fruit and vegetables. 
It is likely that Russia may use energy coop-
eration projects as an additional instrument 
of pressure. The Moldovan and Armenian en-
ergy sectors, for example, are almost entirely 
dependent on Russian gas13. Similarly, despite 
12 Currently, there is an embargo on the import of the con-
fectionery products of the Ukrainian company Roshen, 
and duty has been reintroduced on the imports of pipes 
produced by Ukraine’s Interpipe Group. There is also an 
embargo on the import of Moldovan alcohol.
13 Moldova imports only some of its electricity from 
Ukraine.
The primary objective of the current offen- 
sive is to prevent or at least weaken the 
success of the Vilnius summit.
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the recent attempts to diversify its energy sup-
plies, Ukraine remains highly reliant on Russian 
fossil fuels. Moscow could instrumentalise ne-
gotiations of a new gas contract for Moldova 
for 201414, its negotiations with Armenia and 
Ukraine on the pricing of Russian natural gas, 
as well as its talks with Kiev on the interpreta-
tion of the ‘take or pay’ clause in the current 
Russian-Ukrainian contract, and the potential 
debt of the Ukrainian state if the clause were 
to be recognised as binding. Another import-
ant tool of pressure that can be used by Mos-
cow is access to the Russian labour market 
(including Russia’s implicit tolerance of illegal 
migrant workers). Labour migration is particu-
larly relevant to Russia’s relations with Moldova 
and Armenia – in 2012, migrant workers from 
these two countries sent back remittances esti-
mated at 15% and 10% of their countries’ GDP 
respectively15. The Ukrainians, meanwhile, con-
stitute the second largest group of immigrants 
in Russia. Immigration officials estimate their 
numbers at 1.3 million, although unofficial esti-
mates put the figure at 2.5-3 million.
Issues related to the security and stability 
of the region are also likely to be used by 
Moscow as means of pressure. The most like-
ly issue to be exploited is the conflict in Trans-
nistria. In June 2013, Yuri Shevchuk, the leader 
of the breakaway Transnistrian republic, signed 
a decree delineating the Transnistrian borders 
with the Republic of Moldova, under which 
a number of Moldovan villages have been placed 
within Transnistria. Attempts to enforce and de-
marcate the new border could lead to a serious 
conflict with Chisinau. Furthermore, Moscow 
14 According to a statement released by Moldova’s Deputy 
Prime Minister and Energy Minister Valeriu Lazar after 
his return from Moscow on September 23, the current 
contract for the supply of Russian gas is to be extended 
until 2015. The relevant documents, however, have not 
yet been signed.
15 Moldova has already reported the first signs of tighter 
controls at the Russian-Moldovan border, which in many 
cases results in Moldovan citizens being refused entry to 
Russia. There have also been reports of Moldovan mi-
grant workers being deported from Russia.
may engage in activities aimed at destabilising 
the region by offering its support to pro-Rus-
sian and anti-EU groups in Moldova’s Gagauzia, 
Eastern Ukraine, and Crimea. Georgian break-
away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
might also be used in order to destabilise the 
situation on the border with Georgie. Recently, 
the Georgian authorities have warned that the 
Russian military have been moving the fence 
separating South Ossetia from Georgia deeper 
into Georgian territory.
It can be assumed that Russia also hopes that 
internal problems in the countries aspiring 
to sign association agreements with the EU 
may stall the process as well. Among the 
obstacles for the signing or initialling of the 
agreements at the Vilnius summit could be Ki-
ev’s failure to resolve the impasse over Yulia Ty-
moshenko, or a potential lawsuit filed against 
Mikheil Saakashvili after Georgia’s presidential 
elections scheduled for October.
Nonetheless, even if the association agreements 
are not signed or initialled at the Vilnius sum-
mit, Russia is unlikely to end its offensive. Mos-
cow will certainly seek to permanently block 
the development of closer ties between 
the EU and Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and 
Georgia. Moreover, it appears that if Russia’s 
current attempts to pressure the former Sovi-
et republics into compliance prove successful, 
Moscow will continue its efforts to coerce the 
countries of the region to join its Eurasian inte-
gration project. Russia may also want to com-
plete the takeover of Ukraine’s gas pipelines by 
establishing a gas consortium or purchasing 
a controlling stake in the network.
Equally, if the countries in question were to re-
sist the pressure of the Russian state and decide 
As a propaganda counterweight to the 
Vilnius summit, Moscow will try to high-
light the successes of Eurasian integration.
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to press ahead with establishing closer ties with 
the EU, the rivalry over the region’s geopolit-
ical orientation would continue. In such case, 
Russia would seek to block the ratification 
of the association agreements in Ukraine 
and in those EU member states where it has 
sufficient influence, such as Greece and Cy-
prus. Moscow would also make every effort 
to persuade Moldova, Georgia, and possibly 
Armenia, not to sign the agreements they 
have initialled in Vilnius.
Either way, one can assume that at the next 
meeting of the leaders of the member states 
of the Customs Union and the Common Eco-
nomic Space, which routinely should be held 
in early December, Moscow will try to show-
case the successes of Eurasian integration. 
As previously announced, during the meeting 
Ukraine was (expected to sign a series of doc-
uments formalising its observer status at the 
Eurasian Economic Commission16. Although 
granting Kiev such status would have little or 
no real significance, Russia may want to use this 
fact to reduce the impact of Ukraine’s decision 
to sign an AA/DCFTA, or alternatively, to stress 
the failure of Europe’s integration policy if Kiev 
should choose not to sign the agreement at the 
Vilnius summit. It is also likely that at the next 
summit Russia will want to capitalise on Arme-
nia’s declaration of its intention to join the Cus-
toms Union, by awarding Yerevan official ob-
server or candidate status. Finally, it is possible 
that Russia will try to tighten formal relations 
between the Customs Union and Kyrgyzstan, 
after Bishkek expressed interest in joining the 
body in October 2011.
16 A memorandum of cooperation was signed on 31 May 
2013. See also T. Iwański, Sz. Kardaś, Ukraine closer to 
the Customs Union. Eastweek, No. 19 (262), https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-06-05/
ukraine-closer-to-customs-union 
